               F-15 Strike Eagle III 1993 Scenario
               -----------------------------------

	On the two year anniversary of the Gulf War, we once again 
find ourselves poised to begin military operations against Iraq. Since 
the Gulf War ended, the failure to remove Sadam Hussein from 
power has come to be viewed as a mistake. At the time, the 
reluctance of the United States and its Coalition partners to become 
embroiled in Iraq ended the ground campaign in just 100 hours. Our 
greatest fear was not that we might lose the war, but that we might 
win it and get mired in a Vietnam-like occupation. 

	In our rush to conclude the Gulf War, public opinion seems to 
have undergone a sea-change in direction. The new consensus is that 
we left before finishing the job. Iraq's brutal dictatorship had been 
compared to Nazi Germany and Hussein had been vilified as being 
the next Adolf Hitler. So it came as a shock that the war ended with 
Hussein still in power. It appeared to some as if the Coalition had 
pushed to the Rhine and then declared the war over.

	The goal of the Coalition in 1991 was limited under a United 
Nations mandate to ejecting the Iraqi army from Kuwait. No 
provision was made to allow for toppling the Iraqi dictator. Clearly 
though, no one outside of Iraq (and perhaps Jordan) would have shed 
a tear had Hussein been "taken out" by a lucky hit. But because this 
didn't happen, because the Israelis have so far shown restraint, and 
because he wasn't removed by his own people, Hussein and his Ba' 
athist party continue to rule.

	Besides the withdrawal of the Iraqi army, another one of the 
cease-fire conditions was the dismantling of Iraqi's nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) programs. This was to be 
systematically accomplished under the watchful eyes of various UN 
inspection teams. From the very beginning, UN teams were deceived, 
harassed, intimidated and prevented from completing their mission. 

	The Iraqis engaged in an elaborate shell game, shuffling 
material between various locations to confuse the inspectors. Several 
of these attempts were captured on tape but little could be done to 
otherwise prevent them. Numerous stand-offs also occurred early on. 
UN team members were often kept from removing incriminating 
documents from government facilities, documents which would have 
outlined Iraq's extensive NBC program. 

	One incident in particular, the barricading of inspectors within 
the Agricultural Ministry in Baghdad, lasted several days. It ended 
only after the Iraqi government allowed the inspectors to leave the 
building with documents they had uncovered.  

	Since the commencement of cease-fire talks on 3 March 1991, 
Sadam Hussein has consistently violated the agreement which 
effectively ended the Gulf War. By denying UN access to weapon 
facilities and announcing that it no longer recognizes the "No-Fly" 
zones, Iraq's leadership has once again placed it on a collision course 
with the United States.

	By terms of the ceasefire agreement Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft 
had been forbidden to fly anywhere within the country. General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to allow Iraqi helicopters to operate on 
humanitarian grounds since the nation's transportation 
infrastructure had been destroyed. It soon became apparent that 
helicopters were being used against helpless civilians. Schwarzkopf 
believed that the Iraqis had fully intended to use helicopters for this 
purpose all along. He had, in his words, "been suckered."

	"No- Fly" zones were established to prevent Hussein from using 
airpower to suppress rebellious Shi' ites in the south and Kurdish 
separatists to the north. Embarrassed by its failure to protect these 
anti-Hussein populations, the UN sectioned off Iraqi airspace south of 
the 32nd parallel and north of the 36th parallel. 

	Several Iraqi warplanes have been shot down since the "No-
Fly" zones went into effect. Throughout this period, Iraqi aircraft 
would race up to the zones then turn away at the last moment. Those 
pilots that misjudged their location and crossed the line have been 
shot down. 

	On the 17th of December 1992, a MiG-25 was shot down after 
penetrating the southern "No-Fly" zone. Exactly one month later a 
MiG-23 was downed by an F-16 firing two AMRAAMs north of the 
36th parallel. The next day (18 January) a F-15C used an AMRAAM 
to take out another MiG-25 in the southern "No-Fly" zone.

	Not only are Iraqi aircraft prevented from flying in these zones 
but surface-to-air missile sites are also not allowed within these 
areas to insure the safety of Coalition aircraft. Likewise, Iraqi SAM 
radars have been repeatedly warned not to "lock-up" Coalition 
aircraft overflying the country.

	Because of the personal enmity between Hussein and George 
Bush, Hussein apparently decided to undertake measures designed to 
embarrass the out-going administration. Despite public comments 
from President Clinton to the contrary, Hussein may also believe he 
can entice the new administration into negotiations. This perhaps 
explains why, after two years, a flurry of violations has suddenly 
occurred. 

	On 7 January 1993, U.N. inspection teams that were returning 
to Iraq after the holidays were denied flight clearances. At the same, 
U.S. intelligence spotted a number of operational SA-2 and SA-3 sites 
within the zones. In addition, mobile SA-6 missile batteries had 
evidently crossed south of the 32nd parallel. This effort to 
reconstitute its air defense system within the "No-Fly" zones put Iraq 
in direct violation of its cease-fire agreements.

	On January 10th, Iraqi military forces dressed as civilians 
crossed into Kuwait and began dismantling a former Iraqi naval 
facility at Umm Qasr. Reports surfaced that a number of Silkworm 
anti-ship missiles were taken back across the border and for the next 
four days this illegal activity would continue. Iraqi triple-A and 
SAMs began moving along the edges of both "No-fly" Zones. The next 
day, the U.S. threatened immediate action if the SAMs were not 
removed from the "No-fly Zones."

  	The cumulative effect of Iraq's provocation was a resumption 
of active military confrontation. Beginning on Wednesday, 13 
January 1993, the United States, Britain, and France resumed 
airstrikes on Iraqi military and strategic targets. Responding to the 
refusal to allow UN inspection teams back into the country, three 
separate strikes took place within five days. This last ditch effort to 
tweak the nose of the Bush administration had brought a strong 
response. Iraq could not help but get the message.

	The first strike involved some 112 aircraft including six 
Tornadoes from Britain and six Mirage fighters from France. Only 80 
of the sorties could be considered "shooters" with the rest being 
support aircraft. 

	Launched from Saudi Arabia and the carrier U.S.S Kitty Hawk, 
the raid was flown against eight separate locations in the southern 
"No-fly" zone. The primary targets were four air defense command 
and control centers and four fixed SA-2/ SA-3 sites. Mobile SA-6 
launchers were also identified and targeted if necessary. The raid 
consisted of a total of 32 separate aiming points divided amongst the 
eight locations. 

	The results of this raid were generally disappointing. After 
debriefing the pilots and analyzing photo-intelligence, the BDA 
showed that the strike was only partially successful. Bombing was 
conducted from 10,000 ft to avoid residual ground fire and poor 
weather in the target area caused severe problems. Only 16 of the 32 
aiming points were hit and many of the aircraft were forced to 
return with their ordnance. Less than 50% of the intended targets 
were damaged and only the radars sites at Tallil and Amara were 
destroyed.

	According to published reports none of the F-16 or F/A-18s 
managed to score hits. The F/A-18s missed all of their three assigned 
targets near Samawah. The six F-16s dropped Mk.84s from over 
10,000 ft. Not surprizingly, without specialized targetting equipment, 
all failed to hit. Only two of the six vaunted F-117As managed to 
deliver ordnance on target. Without the F-15E's TFR, the 
"Nighthawks" were left to deal with cloud cover, seriously 
degrading their ability to laser designate targets. One pilot made a 
navigational error and bombed a farm house over a mile away from 
his intended target.

	The F-15Es performed well and were among the few aircraft to 
hit their targets. With their all-weather bombing systems and 
Terrain Following Radar, F-15s were able score 8 hits on 10 
scheduled targets. The 80% success rate made the F-15 the star of 
the operation. To be fair though, this raid placed aircraft in roles for 
which they were not equipped. Expecting F-16s to hit targets with 
unguided munitions from 10,000 ft in poor weather was asking too 
much.   

	A second raid involving only Tomahawk missiles, was launched 
on the 17th at a nuclear processing facility at Zaafaraniyah 13 miles 
south-east of Baghdad. Forty-five TLAM cruise missiles were 
launched from ships in the Persian Gulf (U.S.S. Cowpens, Hewitt and 
Stump) and Red Sea (U.S.S. Caron). The target was subsequently 
reduced to powdered rubble after taking at least 35 direct hits. At 
$1.2 million per missile, it might have been cheaper just to buy the 
facility rather than to bomb it.

	According to western journalists taken to the site, only specific 
buildings involved with manufacturing were struck. Adjacent 
buildings in the complex were left untouched. One of the Tomahawks 
fired by the U.S.S. Caron , however, was apparently hit by triple-A 
causing it to veer off-course. It slammed into the courtyard of the 
now famous Al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad which happened to be 
holding an Arab League conference at the time. Two women were 
killed in the explosion.

	A third raid, characterized as a re-strike, was launched 
following Iraq's continued refusal to quarantee the safety of UN 
inspection teams. This attack took place in daylight and involved 
some 60 aircraft. F-15Es, which had performed so well on the 13th, 
struck selected SAM sites, radar installations, and command facilities 
in the southern "No-fly" zone. One F-15C managed to shoot down a 
MiG-29. 

	F-15s and F-16s were able to destroy the fixed sites but when 
intelligence noted that the mobile SAMs were missing or on the 
move, the F/A-18 sorties were cancelled. Rather than risk having to 
return to the carrier loaded with ordnance, the Navy scrubbed its 
portion of the attack.

                        --------------

	As noted in the F-15 Strike Eagle III instruction manual, 
military analysts here at MicroProse anticipated a resumption of the 
conflict. To accommodate this eventuality, the design team included 
F-15 missions against a wide range of targets, including the ones 
struck recently in the "No-fly Zones". 

        These recent missions can be recreated without difficulty. The main 
difference between these missions and those conducted as part of the 
1991 Gulf War is that it is imperative to minimize losses. This time 
there is no massive ground army ready to invade and the contest is 
more political than military. The U.S. cannot afford to have its pilots 
shot down and possibly captured by Iraqis on the ground.

	Therefore, when flying these missions it is absolutely crucial 
that you return with your aircraft. Hitting your target is a secondary 
consideration to returning safely. If you have to eject, make sure that 
you are over friendly territory or at least "Fence Out" so that you can 
be rescued. The U.S. cannot be put in a position of having to bargain 
with Hussein for your release. Accordingly, having one of its pilots 
put on trial in Baghdad would be politically embarrassing. If you do 
manage to get captured, plan on staying awhile.

        To recreate these missions, select the Desert Storm theater
from the Home screen.  Then, select "Iraq '93".  The program will now 
generate missions to the actual target areas flown in this latest
action.  See if you can match the real F15E's successes
!
